

## THE CONCEPT AND KINDS OF POWER

by

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### I.

The question of power contains correlations of such a diverse nature that can only be disclosed by comprehensive research. Analysis of these phenomena necessitates philosophical, economic, historical, sociological, social-psychological, moral and legal approach to be made. To this end collective efforts are needed, because individual research makes only one kind of scientific approach possible. It follows from this that I examine the problems of power — when discussing it from the aspect of theory of state — by taking the questions of the state into consideration. Naturally those features of power have to be underlined above everything else which are related to the state or are associated with it.

When separating power and state from one another, an antecedent of the history of theory automatically arises. Earlier politology was engaged with questions of this kind and today's bourgeois politology regards these phenomena to belong to the sphere of its interest. In essence, bourgeois politology considers power and the state as political phenomena. This kind of approach and concept is also present in socialist literature on the subject. In contrast to this, however, in the socialist view to the society the idea of the need for the categories involved to be analysed separately (within the scope of separate disciplines) begins to gain increasing ground. While adopting this view I do not consider power and the state as categories combined with one another because in my approach I regard them as separate social phenomena that are necessarily correlated with each other.

On the basis of the world view of dialectical materialism it is a primary factor that the economy plays an ultimately determining role. However, I must point out that this role of the economy is revealed through intermediary factors of which power and political power are outstanding as phenomena exercising a direct influence on the state; it goes without saying that other factors also have an effect to exert.

Marxist political science has managed to elaborate its today's system of concepts as a result of prolonged and considerable scientific development. Constant improvement and ever more thorough elaboration of the relevant concepts call for newer approaches. They serve as a basis on which the

essential features of the state can be grasped on broader theoretical foundations.

The different branches of Marxist social science determine their subject on the basis of the general theorems of historical materialism and the actual analysis of reality. Thus theory of state which is one of the branches of social science has disclosed the essential characteristics and correlations as well as the rules governing the development of the state. Historical materialism supplied the foundations for Marxist theory of state in its efforts to acquire knowledge of the state being determined by the society, its relative autonomy and social destination. In addition, however, newer approaches are necessary to making it possible to examine the essential correlations of the state from other sides as well in order to find out the specificities that have not as yet been disclosed. It is a fundamental conclusion drawn by historical materialism that the fact that the state is a power organisation is an essential conceptual criterion of the state. In spite of this, however, the peculiarities of the state as a power organisation (and, in general, those of power) have not as yet been thoroughly disclosed.<sup>1</sup>

Several approaches in bourgeois politology attach outstanding importance to the concept of power. *B. Russel* is of the opinion that "the fundamental concept in social science is Power in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics"<sup>2</sup> This conclusion should be regarded as an exaggeration and the analogy used should be considered one-sided; in any case it can be taken as merely a journalistic formulation which is used to emphasize the scientific importance of the category of power. However, it is, in any case, acceptable that the category of power is of greater importance and it plays a more important role than what has so far been attributed to it by research.

It can be stated that within the frames of socialist social science research on power and state has been given an increasing scope recently. This is partly ascribable to the fact that the acquisition of more profound knowledge of the social phenomena and forces exercising an influence arises as a requirement of historical materialism. *Engels* points out that the social forces exert an influence in the same manner as the natural forces, that is at random, by force and destructively as long as we fail to recognize them and do not count with them. Once, however, we have got to know them, he adds, and understand their operation, their influence and the direction in which they act, the extent to which we subject them to our will is merely dependent on us in order to rely on them for achieving our objectives.<sup>3</sup>

This statement made by Engels applies to all the social phenomena including power and the state. The phenomena involved constitute the individual acting forces in the society and as long as we the rules governing them have not been recognized they act at random and in a destructive manner. That is why the acquisition of knowledge of the internal rules governing power and of the kinds of power and disclosing its specificities, and more thorough knowledge of political power, state power and the structure of the state constitute essential factors making it possible to subject



the social phenomena in question to man's will and the domination of human communities.

In Soviet special literature *Korolev* and *Mushkin* have drawn the conclusion that the concept of power has not as yet been elaborated and it is a task for philosophers and jurists to study the problem of power as a general social category.<sup>4</sup> Examination of power is considered to be a necessity today by several Soviet authors in philosophy, sociology, science of law and politicalology. The wording by *Burlatzky* is quite characteristic of the importance of this subject. In his opinion the concept of *power* is an issue of primary importance for political theory and for actual political research. This offers the key to understanding the political institutions, political movements and politics proper.<sup>5</sup>

2. Any natural phenomenon that reveals a major force or exerts stronger influence is regarded by public thinking as power; thus possession of an object or thing, moreover man's will-power and the acting forces of nature are considered to be power. Very often social correlations and phenomena referring to a certain force, prestige, result and lasting qualities are also regarded as power, and for that matter, we frequently speak of the power of a habit or customs, prejudice or tradition, the power of education and learning, literature, religion, arts and the power involved in public opinion is also frequently emphasized. Though all this can obviously be linked with certain correlations and specificities of power, nevertheless they must be separated from the concept of power because they fail to express on a general level the internal characteristics of power as a specific social correlation; they should rather be regarded as journalistic formulations that tend to identify force with power.

As regards the scientific approach to power it must be underlined that power is interpreted by social theory as a social and human phenomenon and it is not identified with the different natural and social forces nor with the possession of things. Research tries to grasp and abstract the essential characteristics of power. The cardinal point we set out from is that power is scientific abstraction which gives prominence to the general characteristics of the concept, while what is general springs to life in the individual.

The different forms and manifestations of power have been disclosed by historical descriptions and research associates with the science of history. It has been concluded that as a result of objective and subjective factors power relations emerge in the community activities of the society, and in these power relations the specific activities carried on, the role played by and power status of the individuals are revealed. There are written records to the effect that in the different human communities the chief or chieftain, the shaman, the magician or the religious leader and, at a later stage, the king, a military leader, the land owner, a leading churchman or even a leading and authoritative personality in cultural and artistic activities had special powers to their credit corresponding to the prevailing social conditions. It goes without saying that in a social community the power in the hands of the leaders or of the king, prime minister etc. is not merely power possessed by the individual in question, but it is the manifestation

or embodiment of a specific institutional power system in accordance with the actual social and historical conditions that prevail. The actual and historically determined power system constitutes the unit the knowledge of which enables the formulation of the specific and general characteristics of power.

While defining the general characteristics of power a number of different approaches can be encountered. There are people seeking the major correlations primarily in factors lying outside or beyond the society in an attempt to grasp the essential characteristics of power. That is why they frequently refer to relations between man and nature and the power possessed by natural forces.

In social theory there is a concept valuing nature as a specific type of power. One natural force is superior to the other and one is subordinated to the other. Analysis of the question of domination or superiority in the realm of natural forces or within their relations would carry us too far and would lead to exaggerated generalizations or concepts without any content (I mean, for instance, points like the domination of the sun over its satellites or the force exercised by the storm over the shrubs, and so on). Superiority of one natural force over another or others should not be regarded as power. The conflict of natural forces with one another is a struggle waged by random forces and it only assumes any importance if the human community emerges in the scene as an organized social force.

Natural forces have a significant role to play in the life of human communities; this is manifested in the first place in the fact that man is exposed to and subject to, in other words, lies at the mercy of natural forces; certain types of natural forces constitute factors that cannot be changed or cannot be influenced from the aspect of human communities. In other words, natural forces are superior in the relations between man and nature or man lies at the mercy of natural forces. It appears, however, that this cannot be regarded as specific power, for it is rather the expression of the superiority of natural forces and it can be considered to have a meaning identical with that of natural force.

Natural conditions, the climate and the geographical circumstances determine the elementary conditions of the survival of man, the formation and subsequent of human communities. It must be stated here, however, that the fact that man can only exist in a community and the individuals can only unfold their natural abilities in human communities is also a natural characteristic.

Human communities are in constant touch with nature and natural forces. In actual fact, while maintaining constant contact with nature man acts as a specific natural force; the human quality that instead of a passive attitude man carries on active community work in order to change the natural conditions has been prevalent from the earliest stages of man's existence.

Active relations between nature and human communities assume a concrete form in human labour. From the aspect of this problem a definition offering an answer has been given by Karl Marx who says that labour



is, above all, a process taking place between man and nature in which man transmits, regulates and controls his metabolism with nature through his actions; man acts in the capacity of a natural force in the face of natural material.<sup>6</sup> It follows from this that human communities limit the different natural forces or bring them under their rule.

Under ancient social conditions human communities sought the natural conditions that provided existence for them. The development of human communities and the increase in their collective power made it possible for them to exploit the given natural conditions and promoted the establishment of natural circumstances that provided means for them to live on safely and offered an abundance of material goods.

As a result of man's natural properties and, above all, following from his ability to exploit natural forces and bring them under his rule several thinkers are prompted to interpret man's natural properties such as his talent, ability and individual output as power. The idea formulated by *Hobbes* is very characteristic of this approach. He says that natural power is such outstanding ability inherent in the body or mind as, for instance, exceptional strength, beauty, intelligence, skilfulness, eloquence, generosity or noble mindedness.<sup>7</sup> An extreme expression of this approach is that the basis of power is sought in man's nature. *A. Pose* arrives at the conclusion that the basis of power is to be found in people's nature and in their requirements born with them.<sup>8</sup>

Obviously, both man and his natural properties are the consequences of the development of the living world. Man's natural properties, however, are far from being identical with power.

It follows from the natural properties of the human communities that they struggle against nature's domination over them and against lying at the mercy of natural forces and they want to enforce their own rule over the natural forces. At the initial phase of the formation of the human society and at the early stages of its development nature is superior to human communities for they are completely subject to it; later, however, human civilization led to human communities gaining the upper hand and dominating the individual natural forces. In connection with this *Engels* writes that only man has been capable of leaving his mark on nature, for he has brought about such changes in his environment, the climate or even the plants and animals that these consequences of his activities will only disappear with the general decay of the globe.<sup>9</sup>

It is an interesting characteristic of social development that while man lay at the mercy of nature, human communities had a very strong internal organization and they were very closed units exactly because they were forced to maintain this attitude to face natural hardships and blows. As soon as man's domination over natural forces came into the picture a new process took place inside the human communities: different types of social organization, articulation and hierarchy took shape. The limited relations of people with nature determine the limited relations to each other between people, while the limited relations between people determine, in turn, their limited relations with nature.<sup>10</sup> As a matter of fact, this formula-

tion can be extended, so far as its essence is concerned, to power relations as well; the extent to which people are subordinated to nature is limited, resulting in underdeveloped relations and, for that matter, a low level of power relations. This means that there is a relationship between the effect of natural forces and human conditions or power relations. As a result of this reciprocal relationship human forces and communities exert an influence on nature, while natural forces have an effect on human relations, on the existence of human communities, on power structure and on its operation.

## II.

1. In previous political and philosophical literature or that of the theory of state the concept according to which power is derived from God (*omnis potestas a Deo*) or it is explained to be stemming from human nature or the good and bad qualities of people was predominant over a fairly long period. Instead of surveying them some characteristic definitions that are available in today's politology will be considered briefly.

In certain approaches made by social theory or even by politology it is quite frequent that the different properties of power are grasped while the concrete and essential correlations are ignored. As a result, the individual definitions contain excessively abstract criteria, and in many cases they are merely speculative formulations. This problem is recorded by bourgeois politology and in summarizing the definitions of power R. A. Dahl establishes some general characteristic features. Firstly, he makes it clear that approaches to power made to date have all been of a speculative nature. He describes the latest definitions as being scattered and incoherent for they give prominence to certain explanations only.<sup>11</sup> The theories of today, however, fail to disclose the internal characteristics of power for reasons of adopting fashionable approaches (game theory, cybernetics, psychological, existential, and so on). A characteristic summary determines the types of power on the basis of the following factors: legality, the nature of sanctions, the extent of sanctions, the means and channels applied. It also proposes that there are three types of measuring power: the criteria of game theory (analysing votes), the quantity of power (the weight of power, the number of topics, objects and values) and the economic criteria (the costs of power).<sup>12</sup>

The different features and forms of power has been discussed in a most comprehensive manner by B. Russel. In his opinion "power may be defined as the production of intended effects."<sup>13</sup> This definition, however, is too abstract and, for this reason, it is not in harmony with the characteristics Russel analyses in detail. This definition fails to promote understanding of the concrete characteristic of power because it regards power as the product of intended effects. Besides, this definition makes the point to be defined even more difficult to grasp and quite and quite vague and, for that matter, it can be extended to conditions that do not belong to the scope and problematics of power (for instance, in terms of its effect the



intention to acquire a certain trade, profession or a foreign language does not belong to the problematics of power).

The renowned American sociologist T. *Parsons* makes an abstract approach to power in his works. In one of his studies he regards power as a generalized *symbolical means* which, similar to money, is circulated, and the possession and use of which enables an office to undertake responsibility effectively in a community because of the authority it commands.<sup>14</sup> This concept offers an extremely witty approach, but it is quite obvious that power cannot be approached as something that circulates like money; its further characteristics contain certain general references to power (for instance, authority and responsibility in a community are characteristics relating to power because they are associated with power relations; nevertheless they cannot be regarded as the major criteria of the concept because they go hand in hand with other criteria.

Perhaps the most abstract definition of power of all the bourgeois politological definitions is the one given by R. A. *Dahl* who describes it as an intuitive concept: *A* exercises power over *B* to the extent that *B* is made to do something and, at the same time, *B* is prevented from acting otherwise.<sup>15</sup> This definition refers to sub- and superordination as well as to the possibility of using force. However, in the society power is manifested only in the surface in one individual exercising power over another and in defining his actions. In a much deeper context power is manifested as relations between social communities, as being one of the fundamental aspects of social coexistence, and one of its superficial manifestations of this can be that one person exercises power over another one.

The shortcoming of the definition put forward by *Dahl* is that while giving too general a definition of power he ignores essential social correlations thereby making it impossible to understand the fundamental internal characteristics. The question arises whether or not it can be regarded as power of social dimensions if student *A* in one class of a school manages to get student *B* to act as he wants him to do, that is *B* should or should do something as required by *A*, or to achieve in a group of friends that *B* acts in accordance with the will of *A*. Naturally, it is quite possible that power and external power relations are reflected or their influence is manifested in the informal relations between certain individuals, but apart from this there is not a sub- or superordination as such existing between the members of a class at school or in a group of people, and the possibility of exerting force through some power is non-existent. Power that prevails in the relations between certain individuals obviously assumes a specific form in an office or at a workshop; it takes the form of relations between the boss and the subordinates (or more generally, between a manager and his subordinates) when the boss achieves that a subordinate follows his instructions and decisions and acts in accordance with his will or refrains from a kind of action as required by his will.

When considering the abstract definitions of power it is necessary to quote the one proposed by M. *Weber*. In his view power in a very general sense should be understood as the possibility for one or more persons to

enforce his or their will in the face of or in spite of resistance displayed by others in order to perform some community action.<sup>16</sup> In this definition objections can be raised to the part "the possibility for one or more persons" because power is a necessary social phenomenon and not merely a possibility, but even if it is a possibility in the hands of certain individuals, it is based on objective conditions. In addition, the reference to the enforcement of a person's own will is considered as inaccurate wording because of its subjective character, for in the will executed through power certain objective needs find an expression excluding the possibility of giving prominence to the criterion referring to the enforcement of subjective will as a fundamental element. Furthermore, in power relations, the essential point does not lie with the enforcement of one or more people, but with that of the leaders on the basis of the socially articulated separation of the leaders from those they lead. It is a positive and outstanding element in this definition, however, that power finds an expression in the action of the community and the will can be enforced.

In the wake of the definitions supplied by Weber and others there are some concept in the socialist literature on the subject interpreting power as the enforcement of one's own will; this is ascribable to the influence exerted by the excessively abstract definitions. A characteristic example in this respect is the way in which *Burlatzky* defines the general concept of power; he says power is a real ability to enforce one's own will in social life.<sup>17</sup> This abstract definition fails to emphasize the special feature of power, because the enforcement of one's will can be concerned with the reading or buying of a book, my friends, students or colleagues (and not my subordinates) sharing my views, then may also act in accordance with my will, but this can, by no means, qualified as power. It can also be stated that the enforcement of one's will may assume the nature of power; in this case, however, the characteristics that follow from power relations must be underlined with regard to the enforcement of the will.

In any case, it is necessary to disclose social psychological correlations in the course of studying the concrete, individual characteristics, kinds and institutions of power and to use them while determining the conceptual characteristics of power (even in respect of enforcing one's will).

In Western politology power is frequently identified with influence or with the special form of influence. The definition put forward by *Lasswell* and *Kaplan* is very characteristic in this respect. They say that power is a special case of exerting influence; it is the process of exerting an influence on the behaviour of others with the aid of strict sanctions (potential or actual ones) in case this behaviour is not identical with the required model.<sup>18</sup> This approach obviously possesses a realistic basis because influence is a correlation having a role to play in power relations. In addition, it correctly emphasizes the sanction necessary for enforcing the influence.

Others, however, are of the opinion that power is a possibility of making others do something. A characteristic definition sharing this view says that power is understood to be a possibility of getting others to act, think



or feel in a way they are wanted to.<sup>19</sup> This is also too abstract a definition and fails to grasp the specific internal characteristics of power.

Power cannot thus be confined to such abstract and too general a formulation that was illustrated in the foregoing (the production of intended influence, a generalized symbol, A possessing power over B, enforcing one's will, exerting an influence, sanctions, and so on). However, conclusions based on the abstract and too general formulations can be drawn as to some of the general correlations that were recorded from different approaches and on the basis of different viewpoints. Naturally, they necessitate further analysis and more concrete determination.

2. In to day's politology there are also formulations alongside the abstract approaches which contain a concrete specificity and the independent actual criteria of power. The concept according to which decision is the most essential feature of power is a very widespread one.

In this approach several people are of the opinion that power should be identified with the actual authority of taking decisions, in other words, power extends to the limit to which the possibility of or right to take a decision extends. Of the concepts laying special emphasis on decision-making which, they say, is of paramount importance, the one submitted by *Lasswell* and *Kaplan* is worth quoting. Their concept is that power is participation in the decision-making process: G possesses power in respect of value over M provided G participates in making decisions that concern the policy pursued by M towards value K.<sup>20</sup> This is translated into practical terms by *Lasswell* who identifies power with the authority of taking important decisions.<sup>21</sup>

The identification of decision with power is detectible in Polish political literature as well. *Bauman* underlines the characteristic referring to decision-making when he says that power is the order of decision-making. It is common to the decisions constituting the domain of power that intervention is made into the conflicts of interests and the methods of the distribution of wealth is specified.<sup>22</sup> *Wiatr* emphasizes much the same aspect when he says that power is the realistic possibility of taking decisions that are important socially which, in turn, determine the attitude to be displayed by those being led and the method of settling social conflicts.<sup>23</sup> In essence the formulations given above contain references to political power as well, a feature rendering them one-sided; besides, the point that *Wiatr* underlines in connection with taking socially important decisions (which, incidentally, is identical with *Lasswell's* formulation) gives rise to objections. In the institutional frameworks of power decisions do not necessarily refer to socially important issues (of course, taking decisions on matters that important from the viewpoint of a given community), nevertheless with regard to them a certain measure of one-sidedness can be detected. According to the lesson drawn from history the cause lying behind the fall of several power structures was that they proved to be incapable of solving essential problems that were of vital importance from the point of view of the existence of a community or the survival of a specific community; the leading organs of power or the institutions of the community took in-

correct or inadequate decisions. This, however, constitutes only one side of the power structure; the statement that inadequate decisions or inappropriate mechanism of decision taking are responsible for the fall of power structures would be an absolutely one-sided interpretation if references were to be made to certain historical examples.

It is quite natural while recognizing the problem of one-sidedness that in the course of arranging social coexistence and conducting it power cannot break with the problems of a given community and the necessary decisions must be taken by bearing these problems in mind. It must also be stated here that in power relations decision generally assumes the form of an essential correlation.

Concerning decisions it must be emphasized that the settlement of the problems of a community usually do not end in taking a decision. Social power organizes the execution of decisions within an institutional framework and the possibility of enforcement and the arbitrary implementation of decisions are attached to it.

Several theoretical approaches emphasize *control* as a separate feature of power. Control within the frame of exercising power is considered to be very important. According to some opinions control is regarded in the process of decision-making as one of the elements of implementation of a decision.

In the view of others the practising of power goes hand in hand with the abuse of power; the introduction of control is believed to lead to the elimination of the abuse of power. Control serving the purposes of eliminating the abuse of power obviously refers to a broader correlation (not only to controlling the implementation of decisions but also to the general features of power).

Bourgeois politology contains the concept of control as being a general correlation. That is why control is sometimes formulated as follows: power means that one man exercises control over the views and actions of other people; the possession of power is a prerequisite of control.<sup>24</sup>

Giving prominence to control refers to an essential correlation because power being an institutional social relation also means control over the actions of groups of people including the taking of decisions and their execution as well as supervision of the activities of the leaders and those being led by them and the operation of the individual institutions of power.

Control over the leading organs of power is a long standing and major social problem. It was formulated way back in the Roman political thinking as follows: *quis custodiet custodes*, meaning: who controls the guards? In general the possession of power means control over the execution of decisions rather than the examination of the kind of decisions taken by the leaders; in other words control is not extended to controlling the leaders in every type of power. In any case power brings about different solutions of control in the development of the society and every power structure contains specific control systems. In actual fact the vitality, flexibility and life-span of each concrete system of the institutions of power depend also on the extent to which the control system is successful.



Decisions, the execution and control of decisions necessarily influence the method of enforcement. Actually, the problem arises: what makes it possible to enforce the decisions taken by power? The primary answer to this question is that coercion ensures the execution in practice of the requirements of power.

3. Power is often identified with coercion and violence. *M. Duverger* writes that power is the phenomenon of violence, restriction and coercion.<sup>25</sup> It must be made clear at this point that there is opinion contradicting this view by stating that violence alone cannot be power.

Coercion is one of the specificities and conceptual elements of power but a part can never be identified with the whole. Violence, on the other hand, is one of the forms or means of coercion which can primarily be enforced in the course of the operation of the individual organs of the institutional political power.

One of the elements of power is the possibility and institutionalization of coercion. This means that the method of coercion assumes different forms in the various periods of social development and in the different types of power. Economic coercion or ideological coercion (spiritual coercion or discipline for educational purposes) are of a different character compared to political violence that can be adopted by the institutions bearing arms. Thus violence does not, in general, constitute an element of power, for it is merely the activity of the coercing organs of the political power. Generally, coercion is classified into the category of the features of power (enforcing power decision by exercising spiritual or physical influence).

In bourgeois social theory it is underlined as a specificity of power that not only coercion belongs to power but the voluntary action or obedience on the part of the rank and file is also its part and parcel. *C. Merriam* points out the relations between coercion and conviction when he says that the monopoly of force which is often declared as being the principal characteristic of political union is not designed for everyday use, for it is a final means to be used when every measure of conviction and reconciliation has failed.<sup>26</sup> There are historical examples to prove that the guiding practice of power and the enforcement of decisions were lasting and effective when agreement on the part of the rank and file with the leaders was in the foreground and if they voluntarily and consciously followed the decisions taken by their leaders.

Several bourgeois philosophers underline the agreement of the rank and file as a basis of the power structure. There are concepts regarding the agreement of people as the decisive aspect of power. This approach is the central idea of the contract theory. The view propagated by *Hobbes* is also characteristic of this. He says that the collective power of a multitude of people which is delegated to a natural or corporate body by common consent is the greatest of all human powers because it possesses the power of all those depending on its will. A power of this kind is, for instance, state power.<sup>27</sup>

In general, in a power system the group of leaders tries to establish a situation in which conscious and voluntary subordination is in prominence.

*Grotius* also refers to this correlation when he quotes *Sallustius* as saying: the Romans considered it to be more correct to acquire friends instead of slaves and thought it safer to rule over voluntary subjects and not over those forced to be subordinated. He also notes that the type of rule with which those subject to it are satisfied is the most consolidated rule.<sup>28</sup>

Different approaches grasp the need for supporting power in a very diverse manner from a theoretical aspect, and it is attempted to concentrate the approach mostly on the spiritual, conscious and self-sacrificing ideals of the subordinates. Others believe that voluntary support is given to power for fear of coercion. In connection with this the latest concepts point out that the practising of power contains two aspects: one is agreement and the other is coercion.

Very often coercion and voluntary obedience are regarded as characteristics excluding one another. That is why there is a concept regarding coercion, or obedience or voluntary subordination as power. In practice, however, these two aspects are joined to one another. Close alliance between them, however, does not exclude the possibility of their separation from one another in view of the fact that in social relations one or the other aspect of practising power can be prominent. This is manifested in the fact that the fundamental form of practising power can be a democratic system of relations based on agreement, while in another case it is rule or domination based primarily on coercion.

In today's Western politology *S. M. Lipset* considers social consensus as the essential and decisive aspect of power as against conflict emphasized as a feature of power.<sup>29</sup> A manifestation of this approach is that several bourgeois politologists tend to consider the essence of democracy to be lying in the fact that government is effected with the consensus of those being governed.<sup>30</sup>

It can be concluded from what has been discussed so far that with regard to the principal features of power even non-Marxist scientific thinking has reached some exact results. Of the objective characteristic defined in bourgeois politology the criteria of decision, control, coercion and consensus can be singled out. They are accepted by Marxist social theory, or more exactly they are incorporated into its power theory, that is to say by elaborating the partial correlations and taking advantage of the exact results the essential criteria of power are formulated. In addition, it can also be noted that in socialist political theory there are also views adopting the bourgeois politological theses without any criticism or reservation except for the fact that they are formulated by relying on the socialist terminology.

### III.

The essential difference between socialist power theory and the related previous and today's bourgeois concepts is that it ignores the speculative and too abstract definitions and incorporates the conceptual expression of the actual correlations into the general concept, that is into the general theory of power. Apart from this the most remarkable conceptual



difference is that socialist power theory grasps power in its social and historical context.

*Marx* and *Engels* point out the most essential correlations, in fact the cornerstone of the understanding of power and grasping it theoretically when they say that by his nature man is a social being and as such he can develop his real nature only in the society and the power of his nature should be measured not by the power of the individual but by that of the society.<sup>31</sup> This statement underlines very clearly the fundamental characteristic from the viewpoint of the understanding of power: the power of man must be measured not by the power of the individual but by that of the society. This means that in connection with this not the natural abilities of the different individuals must be examined; instead the point to be taken into account is the kind of collective effort on the part of human communities which is capable of creating social conditions of existence, performing the duty of defending social coexistence from inside and outside and serving the interests of human communities.

It is a commonly known Marxist thesis that cooperation within a community and collective efforts have enabled man to face natural forces, to bring the forces of nature under control and to further develop his natural abilities within the frame of the community. Man was transformed into a social being from a natural being and the community enabled him to unfold and enforce his natural abilities and to concentrate them into community activity and condense them as social power. In this manner the natural power of people came to be concentrated as community power and social power in community activities.<sup>32</sup>

Collective efforts and collective actions of human communities and the concentration of human powers are made in different fields of life. In connection with ensuring the conditions of existence of a community the major fields of activity are defence against natural disasters, provision of the elementary requirements, acquisition of material goods and the organization of labour and production. Organization of the efforts of the communities of people and controlling the metabolism with nature presupposes the community power of people. Man who has become a social being and the associated producers reasonably regulate and bring their metabolism under their common control instead of allowing it to rule over them as a random power.<sup>33</sup> It follows from this that collective effort means regulatory and control activity above all in production. As a result of the regulation and control of metabolism with nature the condensation and institutionalisation of collective efforts made by people as power is an essential field of power. This shows that power relations are related in the first place to the requirements of production (such as ensuring living conditions and organizing labour). The organization of production necessarily brings about the concentration of the efforts made by human communities, their condensation as power and the building up of power relations.

*Marx* and *Engels* point out that social power, that is multiplied productive force which is established as a result of cooperation between different individuals in the division of labour does not constitute the united own

power of the individuals concerned — since cooperation is natural and not voluntary — but it assumes the form of an alien power beyond them about which they do not know where it steams from or in which direction it proceeds and therefore, they cannot bring it under their control.<sup>34</sup> The idea put forward by Marx and Engels that social power is “multiplied productive force” and the united power of individuals which is manifested through cooperation between different individuals determined in the division of labour is of general validity.

2. It can be underlined as an essential feature of power that fundamentally it is presupposed by the existence of human communities. Within this, power is based, in the first place, on production relations; it means the expression and concentration of collective social efforts; it follows then that it constitutes the objective need for social coexistence.

The social destination of power could be formulated in a most general manner by saying that it serves the purposes of providing for the internal unity and organization of communities and defending them from outside factors in the defence of community existence. As the objective necessity of social coexistence power is manifested in the first place in the arrangement of the internal life of the communities, in organizational and regulatory activities designed to ensure order in community activities and protecting the community from outside factors.

Social coexistence has a number of different correlations and several factors contribute to its development. In general, the joint influence exercised by contradictory factors results in the well established forms of coexistence. Contradictions bring about the unfolding of specific solutions and order of coexistence along with the development of, changes in and the formation of the new qualitative characteristic of coexistence and the emergence of new structures. The contradictions of social coexistence are also reflected in power, which, as a separate social phenomenon, contains special dialectics.

The dialectics of phenomena presupposes, in general, the struggle between and unity of opposites. Power contains the dialectics of the struggle between and unity of opposites. Power, however, does not only possess its own internal opposites but it is also attached to the other contradictions of the society and, for that matter, expresses the internal contradictions inherent in a given social structure or setup. Power has an interesting feature, namely, it aims at either resolving or confining contradictions prevailing in the communities of the society to the limits of a framework and establishes or ensures the unity of contradictions. The fundamental social destination of power in the coexistence of communities and to establish social integration and social security. While being fundamentally associated with the given social conditions power provides for the orderly unity of communities, levels up the struggle between opposing forces and unifies the society or a given community.

Power emerges as a unifying factor at the different stages of social development. In connection with the social structure of the primitive community *Engels* notes that this organization is suitable for levelling up



every conflict that can arise within a society thus organized. Furthermore, in connection with class societies he states that contradictions and classes with conflicting economic interests should not wipe out one another and the society itself in a fruitless struggle; instead, there is need for such a power that takes the edge off conflicts and keeps them within the limits of order.<sup>35</sup> This recognition by *Engels* emphasizes the need for ensuring the stability and integration of social conditions as a specific destination of power.

Historical experiences prove that without the cohesive force of power the society is bound to fall into pieces either in a way that a given social unit (a nation, a country or empire) is gone from the scene of history or a new social force establishes its own system of power institutions, a leadership composed of new people or power of a new structure is established.

Historical events can testify to the highly important role played by power in the life of a nation. There are innumerable historical examples on hand to prove that once a nation or social community possessed a dynamic, effective and successful power structure capable of concentrating the different communities or the society as a whole over a longer period of time, it could sustain, historically speaking, its internal unity over a longer spell of time and perform its defensive function successfully against external factors. On the other hand, if a power setup was shaky the disruptive forces led to the fall of a nation because of the lack of cohesive force, nations grappling with the above problems were reduced to a state of anarchy, lost their historical role for good, were gone and were melted into another nation or state assuming a passive historical role and eventually became subordinated. In addition, the historical specificity must also be underlined that certain nations had to leave the historical scene because their power structure proved to be too conservative, too inflexible and, for that matter, they were incapable of adjusting themselves. Other nations, however, managed to play a significant role for a prolonged period as a result of their flexible power system.

It follows from the above that the role concerned with the defence of the orderly state of given social conditions, ensuring their stability and sustaining social integration can be singled out as the general features of the content of social power. Apart from this it is necessary to point out that power is not a sort of constant and unchangeable phenomenon which attend to its duty of holding the society together in a static manner; quite the contrary, it is highly elastic and changeable and as such it performs the work of defending the unity of social communities in accordance with the prevailing social circumstances.

Power protects the integration of the society by regulating and organizing human communities. This regulatory activity is emphasized by *Karl Marx* when he points out that the associated producers regulate and bring their metabolism with nature under their control. He goes on to say that regulation and order are the forms of the social consolidation of a productive system and, for that matter, they are also forms of being comparatively released from sheer despotism and sheer chance<sup>36</sup>.

3. In order to ensure "regulation and order" power carries on leading activity in the society. Leadership finds expression in several forms as an essential feature of power; it denotes the guiding, organizing and regulatory activity. There is a specific mechanism attached to leading activity. Within its frame the activities performed by the different communities and individuals are directed by different commands, orders, decrees, prescriptions and norms.

In actual fact leadership necessarily coincides with social coexistence, but this can only be the consequence of power. Power which is, among other things, community activity and joint effort includes guidance as well in order to concentrate people's labour. Referring to correlations other than this Karl Marx states (what applies to the present correlation) that direction is more or less necessary in respect of every kind of directly social labour or one of a major size to be performed by a community, because it provides for harmony between individual activities.<sup>37</sup> This recognition mentions highly essential properties even with reference the general characteristic of power; leadership is necessarily attached to ensuring the harmony of community activity and to concentrating forces.

Power is frequently identified with the possibility of giving orders or taking the position of a commander. Obviously, this is only one of the elements of the very diverse phenomenon of power. In fact, guidance is implemented in the form that in the course of social coexistence the leader takes different decisions, sets different tasks, establishes certain rules and gives orders. Formulation of the requirements of power in the will, order or instruction by a commander can be regarded as an essential element of leadership.

It goes without saying that leadership cannot be effected spontaneously. Institutional solutions are necessary for the implementation of guidance, which find an expression in the organizational separation within the communities. It is an essential property of direction that it is embodied in different social institutions and it is institutionalized in different human relations.

In general, power and within this direction presupposes that the governors and the governed are separated from an organizational aspect and within an institutional frame as an objective necessity. Relations between leaders and the rank and file are not incidental but constant in the society. It follows from the destination of power that the stability of the society needs constant power relations to be prolonged and institutionalized.

The organization by power of the social communities results in some people possessing a post of leaders in the power structure over the others. Starting from the most primitive communities to the community organization of the modern societies it is obvious that the leaders and the governed are separated in every community and institutionalized power relations are established between the leaders and rank and file of the community.

In social sciences the institutional separation of the *leaders and the rank and file* in the different social relations as the organizational expression



of the form of power can be regarded as generally accepted. The position of the leaders, that they can give orders and guidance and have the possibility to exercise coercion and the subordination of the rank and file, their obligation to obey and that they can be coerced are separated from one another in the institutions of power. This correlation was formulated in the most concise manner in Marxist social theory by *Gramsci* who said that the primary element of power is that there are governors and governed, leaders and rank and file.<sup>38</sup>

The natural abilities of man necessarily presuppose community activity in connection with the defence of his existence and ensuring the conditions of his co-existence. Participation of the individuals in the social life, work and defence of the communities as a necessity calls for the establishment and operation of a community power organization. The striking manifestation of the power structure is the separation of leaders from rank and file. However, there is a relationship between these phenomena that are qualitatively different: in the course of community activities certain personal abilities have a role to play in that certain people become leaders while others remain to be led, nevertheless the power relations between people do not arise from people's natural abilities. The specific system of the institutions of power and the order of selection are responsible for the separation within human communities of leaders from those of the rank and file in the organizations, a fact fixed even in organizational activities.

The separation of the leaders from the rank and file in power relations accounts for further specificities. The different power positions held by people are not manifested in relations of equal footing because differences in the power positions result in subordination which, in turn, serves the purposes of organizing cooperation and implementing leadership. Power ensures that one person carries on his activities in harmony with another and that the communities concentrate their forces. While organizing cooperation it is a necessity that the members of the community are subject to the will of the leader within the institutionalized frames of power. In his article written on authority *Engels* underlines that a certain type of subordination is something that we must bear and accept irrespective of the social organizations concerned because the material conditions under which production and the change of products are effected force us to do so.<sup>39</sup>

In contrast to the anarchistic anti-authority position *Engels* poses the question of how a society composed of as few as only two persons can exist without either of them giving up part of his autonomy.<sup>40</sup> This formulation refers to the fact that every type of community needs subordination in order that cooperation and coexistence be organized and that the members of the given community be led. Since every kind of social community presupposes leadership and organization as necessities, it follows that guidance, the separation of leaders from those they lead and subordination constitute the features of power.

4. *Coercion* is an additional property of power. In power relations institutionalized direction, the fact that there are leading positions and there is subordination presuppose the possibility of coercion.

Quite a few thinkers consider coercion as the essential or most essential element of power. Approaches of this kind, however, fail to take into consideration the many-sidedness of power and the fact that coercion is a consequence. It can be noted here that according to general historical experiences in case the power relations are shaky and instable, violence comes very much in to the picture, while in consolidated power structures coercion very often play an inferior part.

Naturally, coercion assumes forms corresponding to the prevailing social and power relations. The forms of coercion reflect the stage of development of given social and organizational power relations. There are quite a few manifestations of coercion and its solution also has a fairly broad range. Of all the possible varieties the force of habit, spiritual influence or coercion are at one end and physical coercion, armed violence and, in the final resort, wiping out individuals or communities physically are at the other end.

The methods of coercion and conviction as well as influence exerted to achieve obedience are, as a rule, associated with one another in power relations. The extent to which the given power relations are lasting is revealed through the attachment of the two sides (ensuring consensus, voluntary obedience and the possibility of coercing) to one another and their proportionate realization. Coordination of conviction and coercion is of particular importance in the establishment and lasting operation of the modern power structures. Commenting on the victory of Soviet power *Lenin* notes that it managed to triumph because it could combine coercion with conviction.<sup>41</sup>

In everyday thinking coercion is frequently believed to be of the same sense as state violence, the physical coercing activities of state organs. Marxist social theory disagrees with this approach and position and discards the concept identifying coercion of power with state power. This view was formulated by Struve in Russian political literature and while arguing with it *Lenin* states that it is absolutely incorrect to consider the fact that the state is coercing power to be a distinctive feature of state; coercive power has prevailed in every human coexistence including the tribal organization or the families in which there was no state.<sup>42</sup> What follows from this statement is the Marxist thesis that coercion which is one of the features of power is present in every form of human coexistence, but coercion or violence applied by the state is different from that.

Consensus and coercion being elements very closely linked with one another are singled out by today's Marxist literature as essential peculiarities of power. Referring to class societies *Gramsci* states that the ruling class tries to achieve that those governed actively agree.<sup>43</sup>

5. When summarizing the different features of power the recognition by *Marx* and *Engels* that that they are multiplied productive force and cooperation defined by the division of labour must be emphasized in the



first place. In a broader sense this can be regarded as the united force of the communities, their internal cooperation and articulation. The unification of forces calls for leadership, organization and regulation; forces can only be united by coordinating and concentrating individual activities. That is why the institutionalization of leadership, the separation of the leaders from the rank and file, sub and superordination emerge within power. Following the leader's will or decision, or concentrating them in joint effort cannot be brought about spontaneously; organization and direction induce coordinated community action, the unification of disruptive wills, discipline, limitation or resistance or coercing those that resist and the mobilization of different communities in one line.

Referring to classic Marxist authors *Korolev* and *Mushkin* write that both the society and each of its communities need power. Power is necessary for the regulation of people's social life, that is, of their attitudes and mutual relations. Society subordinates to itself the will of the individuals and regulates the individuals' actions. It is also made clear that the society cannot exist without possessing power over the individuals.<sup>44</sup> This statement also reflects that the different forms of the society and the different communities of the society need power to keep social coexistence in order.<sup>45</sup>

While defining power the individual criteria are substantially summarized by *Tihomirov* who is of the opinion that power is the enormous organizing and regulatory factor of the society. It can be characterized as something that is capable of subordinating the behaviour and activities of people to the will of the whole society or of one class. Power can be expressed as a general will and interest based on voluntary and conscious subordination and as the will of a group of people that exerts coercion over the majority of the members of the society.<sup>46</sup> It is a very important and substantial feature of the definition formulated by *Tihomirov* that power is regarded as an organizing and regulatory factor; besides, it also refers to the other peculiarities.

It can thus be concluded that power necessarily coincides with human society, it performs the duty of organizing and conducting the coexistence of human communities; it is a sort of social relations that means, in an institutional form, leadership on the basis of sub and superordination in the relations between leaders and the rank and file, execution of the orders and instructions given by the leaders, ensures social integration under changing historical conditions and has a special content differing in accordance with the different stages of social development.

6. Historical materialism underlines that power is a social phenomenon changing in the course of history and the social systems possess power structures of different content. However, there are different concepts and views with regard to power and the historical character of power structures.

Concerning the *historicity* of power Marxist social theory states that it constantly coincides with social development and it is a necessary element at every stage. It may well be said that there is no society without

power because power can be considered as a constant factor accompanying human development. In Soviet literature this view has been very demonstratively formulated by E. L. *Kuzmin* who says that as long as there is life upon the earth, as long as man lives in a community, he cannot manage independent of certain organizations, nor can he dispense with coordinating his own activities with those of the other members of the community.<sup>47</sup> This concept is shared by several representatives of bourgeois politology though they have a different world view. *Pose* comments very wittily on this property although he fails to refer to the point of historical determination when he says that power exists because it just cannot be non-existent, for without power there could not be human society.<sup>48</sup>

The former conclusion appears to be exaggerated in Marxist public thinking because the view that power is attached to the appearance of state power and is linked with the existence and development of the state has become fairly widespread. This idea is based on the failure to deny power relations in the primitive community and that a society without power is supposed to exist following the disappearance of the state. That is why the question arose in Marxist literature whether there is power at every stage or only at certain stages of the development of the society.

The absence of power in the society is a belief held by many people on the basis that under the conditions of equality there is no power, no politics and state. It must be emphasized in contrast to this opinion that power does exist even if equality prevails because the coordination of social activities, the direction of the activities of the individuals, their voluntary discipline, the organization and regulation of the activities of the community necessarily bring about power relations in any type of community. Even the clan or tribal organization of the primitive societies constituted a specific power structure, a point that has been verified scientifically on the basis of different research work.

*Engels* also hinted at the presence of power in primitive communities. He pointed out that there were common interests in the communities from the earliest stages, the defence of which was a right vested to certain individuals; this right included the settlement of disputes, retaliation for abuses and religious functions. He went on to say that rights of this kind necessarily coincide with a certain measure of power.<sup>49</sup>

Power was, therefore, present even in primitive communities. It follows from this that historical materialism does not accept the conclusion attaching the emergence and existence of power to a higher stage of social development, above all, to the cleavage of the society into classes and the establishment of class rule and the state.

It is admitted even in bourgeois politology and anthropology that there were different forms of power in primitive societies. It is maintained that the different forms of political, state or legal power were present in them; the power possessed by the leaders is regarded as one of political nature while the different customs and punishments are considered to have been of a legal character. The wording of this correlation formulated by *Malinowski* is very characteristic when he detects in connection with pri-



mitive societies that tradition and the order of mythological and religious needs constitute a specific cohesive force in the different communities and confesses that even local groups have their own membership and central power that is of a more or less advanced stage; besides the division of community function meaning the services rendered and the privileges required is also detectible in them.<sup>50</sup> Concerning power, however, he makes a distinction when he says that a tribe is not necessarily organized politically and when considering power he assumes the use of spiritual and physical violence. Besides, he does not make any differentiation when he discusses legal principles, legal systems, legal needs and legal traditions, points that are obviously inaccurate because legal regulation is linked with the existence of political power as part of the power structure of the class society.

Malinowski and other anthropologists are quite right in detecting power in the clan and tribal organizations, but to state that there was political and legal power referred to the operation of the organizations and rules governing the community is nothing but applying in retrospect the concepts and institutions of a different content associated with class societies which are of a later stage of development to much earlier stages; in other words, it is incorrect to value the community power relations of the primitive society as political or legal power. In actual fact the point at issue is that the power structure built up on the natural conditions of the communities and community property cannot be qualified as political power. Historical development presupposes, as a rule, power and a specific power structure, but it is impossible to detect every type of power including state power or legal power in each power structure.

Considering the historical determination of power Marxist social theory emphasizes that the different peculiarities of social development bring about different power structures so that the internal change of the society leads to the appearance of different forms of power. Power has a different nature in the early stages of the development of the society compared to a later phase of history. This is illustrated by the conclusion drawn by *Marx* who said that the power used to be possessed by the ancient Asian and Egyptian rulers or the Etruscan priest-kings, and so on has been transferred to the capitalist in the modern society irrespective of whether he is an isolated capitalist or a combined one as in the case of the shareholder companies.<sup>51</sup>

In the course of the development of the society the fact that the communities are not articulated or the cleavage into classes and class struggle exercises a substantial influence on the content of power. At the higher stages of historical development the social role played by power is dependent on the class character of the society along with the system of leadership, sub and superordination as well as the method of coercion. It must be emphasized that the class character of power is naturally manifested in concrete solutions at the different stages of social development: the class relations that prevail exercise an influence on the changing content of power, the establishment of its concrete forms and the role they play under the specific historical conditions of the different nations.

In the Soviet literature on the subject *Keyzerov* states that social power undergoes a specific historical development. In his evaluation power is identical or coincides with society in the initial stage, that is in the primitive community; in the second stage power is possessed by the exploiting classes who practice political power, while in the third stage political power assumes a new character because here the majority rule over the minority; in the fourth stage political power withers away, and the nature and methods of social power undergo fundamental changes.<sup>52</sup> Regarding its concept this substantial summary underlines quite correctly that power accompanies human society constantly and it assumes different types of content corresponding to the different stages of social development. (The only objectionable point in *Keyzerov's* interpretation is that he identifies social power with political power in its development in spite of the fact that social power has other types as well.)

In socialist literature on social theory there have been several debates recently on the theory of the social formations. The fact that the individual social formations possess their specific power structure is connected with the above problematics. The development of power relations depends on economic relations that have an ultimately determining effect, and this is the correlation that is frequently left out of consideration by the non-Marxist historical concepts because the propagators of this view fail to see that the prevailing power relations are presupposed economically and historically. Commenting on this *Marx* notes that the relations between ruling and servitude which take the form of and are visible as the direct driving force behind the production process cover up the domination of the conditions of production over the producers.<sup>53</sup> Then he goes on to apply this correlation concretely to the nomadic tribes and says that in the case of nomadic tribes the community was in fact always united taking the form of a group of travellers, a caravan or horde and the forms of sub and superordination arose from the conditions of that particular way of life.<sup>54</sup> Power relations, the forms of sub and superordination, therefore, stemmed from the conditions of the way of life even in nomadic societies. To lay emphasis in this idea is essential because there are quite a few people believing that power relations prevailing in primitive societies were incidental or were ones of a random nature in spite of the fact that they also necessarily follow from the economic conditions.

In the course of human development the different social formations unfold in accordance with the different qualitative specificities of economic conditions. The separate power structures of the different social formations are naturally incorporated into or they are built up on the economic conditions. Ferenc *Tökei* gives a characteristic summary of this correlation referring to the different social formations: "Thus the big family or tribe (or, for that matter, the mandarin state) can only be the institutional basis or the patriarchal inequalities of the individuals; the organization into polises is merely one method of holding slaves that is of increasing importance of other feudal and class inequalities; the actual system of hierarchy ranging from the village communities to the church or to the guilds is nothing



but a corporate institution of feudalism itself." Regarding the connection with the capitalist social formation and its properties he notes that even the capitalist formation fails to eliminate "the relations of personal dependence; all it does is that it makes what used to be direct relations between ruling and servitude transmissible by money. That is why it is a fact that once capital ensured its own domination can easily incorporate into its own system the most ancient forms of ruling and servitude which were virtually provided by nature and by doing so it conserves these forms".<sup>55</sup> This, he adds, is detectible not only in the case of colonization but also in Eastern Europe.

Within the frame of the capitalist social formation a possibility is created for the socialist revolution and for the establishment of an economic and power system of a new type. In connection with *Marx* and *Engels* conclude that Communism upsets the foundations of all the previous relations of production and it is the first to handle consciously all the natural preconditions as these created by people and to remove their natural character from them to subject them to the power of united individuals.<sup>56</sup> This statement contains definite references to the fact that the power of united individuals that is to say the community power structure of the Communist society unfolds in Communism. It is essential to lay appropriate emphasis on this conclusion primarily in contrast to opinions of a simplifying nature which assume the absence of power in Communism.

The property relating to alienation is also connected with the historical character of power. Certain authors underline the alienation of power along with the general properties of power, although this is merely a feature associated with the power systems of certain social formations and it is by no means a constant element of power. The alienation of power is not revealed at every stage of social development.

Referring to the role played by alienation emerging, in general, in the course of the development of the human society and its disappearance *Engels* says that the living conditions that surrounds people and which has so far dominated them is now brought under the rule and control of people who become, for the first time, the conscious and real rulers of nature because and inasmuch as they come to be the rulers of their own socialization. People will apply the laws governing their own social activities and which have thus far been alien to them assuming the form of natural laws facing them and dominating them with complete knowledge which, in turn, enables them to dominate the conditions.<sup>57</sup> This summary by *Engels* underlines that when people became the rulers of their own society they are capable of building up and operating a system corresponding to the interests of human communities. This refers to the hypothesis that in Communism a new power structure will be established in which the power relations are no longer alienated and power will mean the conscious rule of people in social coexistence on the basis of social equality. The classics of Marxism consider this social situation as the realization of freedom through regulation and control effected by the power of the community. In connection with this *Marx* noted that freedom can mean nothing else but the fact

that man who has become socialized and the associated producers reasonably regulate and bring their metabolism with nature under their common control instead of allowing it to dominate them as sheer power.<sup>58</sup>

In essence, a general historical approach to power and emphasizing the point that power is a phenomenon that changes in the course of history allows only one conclusion to be drawn: social coexistence necessitates the existence of power and it is the constant part of the development of the human society. In addition, it also means the special concentration of community forces in the power structures corresponding to the formation and progress of human communities. In the power structures that change in the course of history and have different content accordingly there are different forms and solutions of leadership, organization, regulation, integration of the communities, relations between the leaders and the rank and file, sub and superordination that stem from the needs of the coexistence of the community. The general features of power are revealed in the concrete factors and these general criteria assume a concrete form in the given power relations and other properties, in other words they are embodied in the concrete types and forms of power.

#### IV.

1. It is of common knowledge that in its historical concreteness power reveals different peculiarities in the course of historical development. Each qualitative property and form of manifestation as well as the specific structure and operation of a given concrete power structure are dependent on the specific conditions prevailing in a particular social formation. It is quite obvious that there are differences as to the part played by social power, its buildup and operation in the primitive community, in feudalism or in a socialist society.

Historical analysis of power leads to the formulation of specific properties concerning the power structure of the different social formations. It may well be stated that besides the general concept of power determination of the power structures of the different social formations accounts for what is particular. In addition, a general concept reveals specific features even in respect of characteristic that are recurrent in the course of historical development. Thus the problematics of the kinds of power will emerge on the level of what is particular. Analysis of the kinds of power enables, in addition to promoting to the general conceptual properties of power, the formulation of particular properties that can be generalized from the individual and concrete diversity of the content and forms of power.

As regards the definition of power it is a presumption that power assumes different forms in respect of the social formations concerned. It follows from the analysis made so far that there was no political power as such in the primitive community, but there are different forms of power detectable in class societies.

The different kinds and forms of power were recognized even by initial philosophical and political thinking and it was attempted at that



stage to classify the different methods of leadership and coercion. Classification of the different forms of power is detectible as early as with the ancient Greek political thinkers, but their activity was confined principally to the analysis of the forms of government observable on the surface. (I note here that *Plato* the Greek philosopher attempted to outline the perfect state in an interesting manner, that is on the basis of a comprehensive concept, a state in which scientific leadership, equality and the high standards of education would ensure the settled coexistence of communities.) In order to understand the differences of power relations, as a rule, the forms of managing the states were described and analysed and the royalty, aristocracy, republic or democracy above all emphasized as the separate forms of power.

The different approaches led to quite varied classifications; it must be noted that *Plato* distinguished timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny as the distorted forms of practising of power. A more refined analysis was made by *Aristotle* who classified the states according to the subjects of serving public good and the practising of power and, as a result, distinguishes the royalty, despotism, aristocracy and so on. On the basis of the methods and requirements of practising power *Machiavelli* made a very special classification of power. In addition, the concept of *Locke* can be mentioned who made a distinction between paternal, political and tyrannical power. *Montesquieu* determined the different power branches and the relations among them and concluded that the legislative, executive and judicial power has a part of controlling and balancing between one another.

There are detailed analyses of the kinds of power in bourgeois politology. The related concepts, however, arrive at drawing specific conclusions on the basis of the analysis and classification of mainly political power. Perhaps the best known of all classifications is the one by *M. Weber* who classifies the types of rule on the grounds of legitimacy and, accordingly, distinguishes three types: legal, traditional and charismatic types of rule.

Of the wide variety of classifications the one by *B. Russel* can be mentioned here which presents (in his book, *Power*), in a most comprehensive manner, the different groups of social power, its kinds and forms. *Russel* deals with the lust for power and it is followed by the forms of power (power over human beings, dead materials and the non-human forms of life); he analyses priestly power, kingly power, traditional and newly acquired power, revolutionary power, economic and military power, power possessed by the organizations, belief as the source of power, and so on in separate chapters. This highly diverse analysis and discussion along with the elaboration and description of historical data testify to the diversity of power and to the existence of its different kinds and forms.

In any case it can be concluded that the representatives of bourgeois political thinking make references, in addition to political power, to economic and ideological power as well from very different sides. In American politology, for example, *J. Marshall* distinguishes three kinds of power: first of all physical force or power which he describes as the most primitive

and most fundamental of all weapons. Then comes economic power followed by the use of propaganda or psychological power.<sup>59</sup> In addition, the correlations between secular and church power as well as the connections between and differences of the authority of the throne and the altar are also described. There are separate works devoted to discussing the question of political leaders, their abilities, the role played by the different individuals in power relations, and so on. It can be stated, however, that in spite of all that non-Marxist literature does not possess a comprehensive classification of power relations.

In bourgeois politology the natural abilities of people and political power, social and other relations are frequently confused and priority is given, above all, to the analysis and classification of political power instead of those of the kinds of power. As a result, studying political power and the general properties of power is not separated from one another in bourgeois politology and sociology, a point summarized by Keyzerov as follows: in bourgeois science social and political power is confused.<sup>60</sup> This statement is complemented by the conclusion drawn by Kálmán Kulcsár who says, while criticizing bourgeois political thinking, that "there are several power relations apart from political power."<sup>61</sup>

In Marxist political theory references made to the general features of power and the kinds of power are found among the conclusions drawn by the classics of Marxism. It must be noted, however, that at the subsequent stages socialist political public thinking and scientific literature failed to emphasize the qualitative and formal differences between the different kinds of power. In fact, similar to bourgeois politology, quite a few Marxist political thinkers identified social power which is the general concept of power with political power. This sort of identification and bringing different categories to the same footing made things difficult for clarifying things theoretically, because the qualitative differences of the kinds of social power were not quite clear and it failed to direct attention to examining different properties which, in turn, led to simplified explanations.

This simplification was done away with by Marxist political thinking quite recently on the basis of the analysis of objective conditions and the teachings of the classics of Marxism who underlined emphatically that there are different kinds of power. They hinted at the fact that besides political power, there is also economic and ideological power. In other words, they distinguished three kinds of power: economic, ideological and political power.

Concerning the establishment of the above listed three kinds of power it must immediately be underlined that there are also other types, and there are separate kinds and units of power such as personal power, power in the hands of a group, body and social stratum and power possessed by a leader or leaders in a small community. Because of the general approach to be made concrete analysis of the above listed kinds of power must be dispensed with because the examination has to be confined to the kinds of power mentioned earlier on the basis of the macrostructural analysis of



power. In addition, the power specificities or smaller communities and organizational units must be studied on a microstructural level.

The three types of power listed above cannot be detected in every stage of historical development. Political power is present as a separate one only in class societies, while economic and ideological power is detectable in each social formation. For this reason the kinds of power that are always present, that is the properties of economic and ideological power must be clarified.

2. Historical experiences bear evidence to the effect that *economic* is a constantly detectable property of the coexistence of human communities; without it there is no community coexistence.

It is a well-known historical fact that in an effort to ensure its conditions of existence each community provides not only for the acquisition and production of material goods but it is also necessary to organize the production of such goods, to direct labour to this effect, to protect the conditions under which production is carried on, and to distribute and store up consumer articles. The different communities carried on economic direction and organizational activities corresponding to the prevailing conditions, moreover, they concentrated the force of the members of the community on the acquisition of goods and elaborated special methods for the distribution of the goods. The fact that the accumulation of reserves, the method of distributing and protecting them constituted a substantial task for the community in order to ensure undisturbed existence reflected community organization of a higher level.

In actual fact, economic power means activities an institutionalization relating to the organization of the acquisition of goods for the community. The communities organize their metabolism with nature and to this end a specific system of human relations and division of labour evolve among people in the course of the production process. These relations are embodied in specific organizations and are effected as constant activities within an institutional framework.

In the course of the acquisition and production of material goods and for the purpose of organizing the different works and making coordinated effort power relations develop necessarily within productive relations. Power relation which involves direction, the separation of leaders from the rank and file and the possibility of using coercion takes shape in the production process and it is manifested in the production activities carried on by the communities. In the economy, power relation is embodied in the institutionalization of the division of labour, property, distribution and consumption.

The division of labour is expressed as a specific power relation. Perhaps the simplest case to this effect is the division of labour between the sexes which is embodied in the leading role played by women in the institutions of the matriarchy. The new branches of the division of labour led to an end to equality and as a result of the changes in power relations the leaders became separated from production activity proper and this brought about a power structure of a new quality.

Within the frame of productive relations property contains most strikingly the prevailing power relations. Like power, property is also a constant concomitant of the development of society and it is also presupposed by the metabolism between human communities and nature as well as the existence of communities. The power aspect of property is revealed in the first place by the fact that it determines disposal of the goods and expresses rule over natural forces. In other words, property ensures rule. This power aspect of property assumes a legal character in class societies.

Property is expressed in each social formation as power relation. It is revealed as power relation even in the primitive society when community property is embodied as a specific power relation in the institutions of the communities and in the system of their division of labour and distribution. Referring to the different forms of class societies *Marx* emphasizes that in every formation in which the direct producer remains to be the owner of the means of existence, the tools and working conditions necessary for production, property relations must develop as direct relations between ruling and servitude; for that matter the direct producer cannot be a free man.<sup>62</sup> This conclusion underlines in essence that sub and superordination is a specificity of economic power and, translated into more concrete terms, it is the relation between rulers and servants.

In class societies it is also a power specificity of property that on the basis of private property disposal of the means of production is transferred to the wealthy, the rich, a factor revealed in the economically privileged position and ruling positions of the ruling class. Disposal of the means of production constitutes a basis for the proprietor to play a dominant role and occupy a ruling position in the prevailing power relations.

Economic power position also results in the fact that in a given society a leader or proprietor plays a dominant role in the specific distribution and consumption system of economy; it follows from his privileged position that he satisfies first and foremost his own needs from the goods offered by the society. The characteristic relations of distribution and consumption are effected in specific institutions and are ensured by the instruments of power. As a matter of fact, the relations of distribution and consumption presuppose the institutionalization or a role to be played by the specific economic power.

One of the solutions to the institutionalization of economic power in modern social systems is that a specific system of the organization of economic management develops. The mechanism of economic management or the development or transformation of this mechanism is the consequence of the progress of power relations. It is quite natural that in class societies the economic power possessed by the ruling class develops and modifies the mechanism of economic management as required by the defence of its own privileged situation.

Economic power includes, in effect, direction, sub and superordination, the possibility of economic coercion as well as disposal of material goods, the distribution of goods and the system of consumption. In a given social



formation economic power is embodied in specific institutions extending to the organizations of the system of ownership, distribution and consumption.

No doubt, economic power expresses and is built up on the prevailing conditions in every social formation. As an explanation to this *Marx* stated in connection with the social conditioned economic power that a capitalist is not capitalist because he directs the industry but he is an industrial commander because he is a capitalist. He goes on to say that in the industry the commanding position concomitant with the capital just like in feudalism when conducting a war or jurisdiction coincided with the estates.<sup>63</sup> In other words commander and jurisdiction are the consequences and accompanying factors of economic conditions as power factors.

Economic power assumes different qualitative features in the individual social formations. In the primitive society, it is based on economic equality production and property and the goods are distributed accordingly; economic power expresses and serves the interests of the community as a whole. In contrast to this, however, in class societies economic power is fundamentally in the hands of the rich whose economic position and domination determine the conditions of distribution, the possibility of exploitation, the fact that one class expropriates the results of the work performed by another.<sup>64</sup>

A certain measure of differentiation is detectible in the development of the class society: domination by the class of the wealthy does not or cannot exclude the possibility for the exploited classes to possess some economic power. The influence exercised by the socially subordinated classes on production, the indispensable role they play in connection with the production of goods within the frame of distribution and property relations result in a certain measure of power position either in a way that in the grounds of safeguarding the interests of the community the proprietor class is limited in taking decisions following from their economic power or in a way that the subordinated classes, despite their position, are capable of providing for the satisfaction of their own material demands on a relative higher level. In several cases, limited economic power is the precondition for the struggle to be waged by the oppressed class which is capable, on this basis, of establishing a new economic power expressing and serving its own interests. Based on community property socialism establishes such economic power which, in the early stages, ensures the economic interests and economic equality of the majority of the working people and this is followed by the implementation of the principle of Communist production and distribution within the framework of the new economic power.

Economic power has therefore, different qualitative peculiarities in the individual social formations. Essentially, it contains direction, economic sub and superordination, the possibility of coercion by wealth and decision on the distribution of material goods in production, that is in the organization of labour. Direction, organization and regulation of economic relations as well as the organization of labour are necessarily present in the economic relations and it follows from this that power relations are of

fundamental significance in the economy and the other forms of power exert an influence on it or are attached to it.

3. *Ideological power* is the one that is always detectible alongside economic power which is the concrete kind of power. It has already been emphasized that, ideological power as one kind of power, has always been present in every stage of historical development.

As regards the general characteristics of power it was formulated already in non-Marxist literature that in addition to coercion there are other means such as conviction, voluntary obedience or subordination providing for the long-lasting establishment and operation of power. This general aspect can be given a concrete form if we state that in this respect institutional ideological effect and influence, in other words, ideological power has a fundamental role to play. When defining power in a most general manner by saying that it is a cohesive force ensuring the unity and integrity of a community, the point that is underlined above everything else is that it is founded upon coercion or violence. Several approaches tend to view power as a spiritual cohesive force. In actual fact, all kinds of power relations necessarily contain certain spiritual cohesive factors, nevertheless this can only be regarded as one of the features of power.

In connection with power it was considered to be a general feature that it means united effort and strength on the part of human communities. In the course of rallying forces and institutionalizing them as a power factor the spiritual driving force is a highly essential element. This spiritual driving force comes to be concentrated and institutionalized as ideological power which does not exist in general, for it assumes concrete forms inside the individual communities and the society as a whole. The peculiarity of spiritual power cohesion is detectible in each community. This is qualified as the spiritual and ideological feature of power which is manifested in a concrete manner as ideological power assuming institutional forms.

Bourgeois anthropology that has already been referred to emphasizes that traditions, mythology as well as religious ideas and norms prevailing in the primitive society constitute a cohesive force. It is underlined that the magicians (that is, people carrying on non-productive activities in a community) are detectible in certain communities as pursuing a separate profession. In addition, it can also be concluded that the taboo, fetish, the different symbols of community, sentiment and customs play a cohesive power role.

Cleavage into classes of the society in the framework of a new type of power structure brought about a change in the nature of ideological power as well. It goes without saying that the preceding ideological forms, mythical and religious ideas survived and came to be modified to be adjusted to the new ideological power requirements. Marx and Engels note that the coming into the picture of the priests, the first type of ideologists coincides with the division of labour into material and physical one.

Concerning oriental despotism *Marx* formulates a highly interesting correlation regarding the ideological expression and support of power. He says that part of the yield of surplus labour goes to the higher commu-



nity, that is the ruling stratum of the community or society which, in the final resort exists as a person, and this surplus labour is manifested in both the taxes and the collective labour which is performed partly for the benefit of the actual tyrant and partly to the glory of the unity of imagined tribal authority (Stammwesen) and God.<sup>65</sup>

It can be underlined even on the basis of historical experiences that the theocratic concept of power played a significant role in rendering spiritual support for not only the despotic states of the ancient times but also for feudal, or in some cases, for today's bourgeois states.

The particular specificity of the theocratic concept serving to render spiritual support for power is revealed in the fact that the religious justification of power is confined to a given state or empire: "God and his people, God and his range of authority are closely associated with one another mutually presupposing one another." In their totality the gods of Egypt (or Rome) are concerned merely with Egypt and its people or Rome and its people.<sup>66</sup>

The fact that ideological power is specifically separated and determined by the prevailing material conditions was described by the classics of Marxism. *Marx* and *Engels* (in *German Ideology*) demonstrated primarily in connection with the ideological power of class society that the thoughts of the ruling class are the ruling thoughts in every age, that is the class constituting the ruling material power of the society is at the same time the ruling spiritual power. They go on to say that the class possessing the means of material production disposes simultaneously of the means of spiritual production as well so that the thoughts of people lacking the means of spiritual production are, as a rule, subject to the class holding the means of both material and spiritual production.

In respect of spiritual or ideological power *Marx* and *Engels* emphasized that there are different ideologies present in class struggle or in the political struggles, with the spiritual power of the ruling class dominating. Besides, it must also be noted that even the oppressed class possesses some subordinated power within which ideological power is also detectible.

Ideological power safeguards the interests of a given class within the prevailing society through establishing and spreading its specific system of ideas. The conditions that prevail find expression, as a rule, in specific ideological forms, with religion being the basic ideological expression under underdeveloped conditions.

The part played by religion within the frame of ideological power is very concisely characterized by *Engels* who says that actually every religion is nothing but the fantastic reflection in the people's mind of external powers that dominate their everyday existence, a sort of reflection in which earthly powers assume the form of powers beyond the globe.<sup>67</sup> By attributing a form going beyond the realm of this earth to power religion contributes to the spiritual and emotional acceptance and support of the ruling power. In connection with this György Lukács emphasizes that religion as an ideology that was indispensable for a prolonged period remains to be a

real social power and as such it constitutes the unalienable part and parcel of social existence that prevails.<sup>68</sup>

In the development of ideological power the specificity was revealed under primitive conditions that those who produced and spread the ruling world view were the same people, while under more developed modern conditions the producers of the ruling ideology and thought are separated from those spreading them.

The specificity must also be underlined that ideological power reveals the standards of cultural development as well. Under primitive conditions the different ideologies tried to defend the prevailing conditions and circumstances by formulating mainly mystical supernatural beings and forces, and, at a later stage, as a result of development, ideologies of a higher level and demand were elaborated and a diverse system of the institutions of ideological power was set up and began to function. Under present conditions the establishment of the ruling world view and the elaboration of replies to the new questions which approve of the prevailing conditions constitute a separate scientific activity.

Neither the elaboration nor the subsequent spread of ideologies can be a spontaneous process. A separate group of people is formed to be in charge of this work; the elaboration and propagation of thoughts theoretically justifying the prevailing situation and the political and moral views of the ruling class have established themselves as a separate profession. The modern forms of propagating thoughts are developed in the educational and school system run by the church, in the state educational institutions and teaching staffs, in the press, radio and television as well as in the other forms of the means of mass communication.

The ruling ideological power endeavours to achieve that the way of thinking of the society as a whole, the attitude, way of thinking, world view and approach of the communities and individuals should correspond to the given social conditions, that the prevailing social and power relations be consciously accepted and approved of and that they should be defended, as a spiritual requirement, on the basis of individual and community consciousness and agreement through the elaboration and propagation of primarily a world outlook, religious views, the principal norms and ideals, theories and official scientific thoughts designed to defend the prevailing conditions. Successful propagation of the ruling ideology leads to ideological power emerging as a significant social factor in every social formation. However, it must be emphasized that ideological power came to be modified to correspond to the prevailing conditions and power requirements of the different social formations, or new ideological power concepts sprang to life. It is a specific requirement to introduce into the ruling class not only the traditional power concepts but also new ideological views and to propagate them in the ranks of the oppressed classes which are subordinated. The institutional forms of exercising ideological influence are designed to serve this purpose.

Quite naturally, the ruling ideological power exerts an effect and guides not only the way people think by relying on its institutional education.



nal activities, but it also dominates other areas of spiritual life such as the arts and sciences. In connection with this point Ferenc Tőkei comments that in the Christian religious structure "the fetishizing role played by religion and its domination over the arts and sciences intensified".<sup>69</sup> The ruling ideological power tries to dominate the arts and sciences even under the present conditions; besides, it takes advantage of them for the service of ideological power; apologetic arts and sciences are the direct consequence of this.

Ideological power makes use of the available means of institutional family and community education, of exerting moral influence and effect in general as essential factors in the interest of the ruling class. As a result, ideological power is transformed into material force and material power if the people follow the objectives set and endeavours formulated by the ideology concerned. It is true that *Marx* underlined the significance of theory in another respect but what he said applies to ideological power when he noted that the weapon of criticism cannot substitute the criticism of weapons; material power must be overthrown by material power, but theory becomes material power as soon as it has an impact on the masses.<sup>70</sup>

Like the other kinds of social power ideological power also assumes institutional forms. In the different forms of social development specific institutions emerge as instruments embodying ideological power. It is quite characteristic that the magician, the shaman or the priest, that is to say people implementing ideological power were present already on the different organizational forms of the primitive society, and, at the same time, community institutions such as the assembly of the community, the council of the elders, and so on performed ideological functions either as people or bodies executing religious rites or as those guiding the exertion of spiritual influence or education.

The system of institutions of ideological power is even more striking in class societies. The ruling class has in its hands not only economic power, the means of practicing power with arms but it also has the organs of exerting ideological influence, using spiritual coercion and education at its disposal. Social customs and traditions constitute essential elements of ideological power. They are the means of defending or conserving the prevailing conditions, assuming the role of factors of ideological cohesion. It is commonly known that the traditions of a clan or tribe have a conserving role to play and it is also well-known that feudal or bourgeois customs and morals exert ideological influence and function as the defensive means of the society.

The clergy and the church figure prominently among the institutions of the ideological power of class societies. They play a remarkable role in the defence of the class society as representatives and organs of exercising spiritual and ideological influence. In the course of their struggles the exploited classes fight not only against economic power but also against ideological power. With reference to this *Marx* concludes that the Commune of Paris embarked on breaking the power of the clergy, the spiritual force of oppression.<sup>71</sup>

Considering the ideological power of the oppressed classes the specificity can be underlined that in the Asian, antique and feudal social formations mystification and deification of the ruler and the ruling class accounted for a substantial ideological force in preventing rebellions and uprisings on the part of the oppressed. It is interesting to note that the different uprisings were given ideological support either through the encouragement offered by the prophets or the explanations of the special dogms of religion. For example, the leaders of the peasant revolts produced evidence on the basis of quotations from the Bible that the landowners had no right to rule and that the uprising they initiated and led was just and justified. The oppressed class becomes such a conscious power factor in capitalism which is capable of establishing its own ideology and ideological power. The subordinated ideological power of the working class comes out in opposition to the ideological domination of the ruling class and struggles even against the capitalist power structure by using ideological means based on scientific foundations.

Obviously, ideological power cannot be isolated from the other kinds of social power despite the different qualitative specificities, because it plays its role in close alliance with them; it acts as a complement for them or serves their enforcement and the exertion of their social influence. Although they are closely joined to one another, it cannot lead to ignoring the disclosure and analysis of qualitative differences.

4. *Political power* constitutes the third kind of power. With regard to it emphasis must primarily be laid on its characteristic that it develops in class societies, it is associated with class struggle and right after its coming into the picture it plays a role of primary importance out of all the different kinds of power.

*Engels* makes references to the separation of political power from the economic one in the period of the disintegration of feudalism and points out that in facing the nobility capitalists possessed a constantly increasing arsenal of economic power while political power was in the hands of the nobility in the course of the whole struggle.<sup>72</sup> In the bourgeois revolutions the bourgeoisie acquired political power in addition to economic power. Political power, however, did not constitute the principal element of the social power of the bourgeoisie; the enforcement of economic domination was in the focus of attention and the part played by political power was largely dependent on the prevailing social conditions. It is quite characteristic that in the time of liberal capitalism political power was not a prominent issue because as *Lenin* put it, economic domination means the key issue for the bourgeoisie while they regard the form of political power as a question of little if any importance.<sup>73</sup> It must be noted here that this state of affairs changes in the period of monopoly capitalism; bourgeois political power comes into prominence and emerges as the principal factor in the defence of prevailing economic conditions.

Political power is very closely linked with economic and ideological power. Following its establishment, that is after coming into the picture as a separate kind of social power besides economic and ideological power it



becomes inseparable from them. However, separation and association do not mean relations between phenomena of equal footing, because the existence of class rule presupposes that economic and ideological power can only be linked with political power in a way that the former kinds of power can only play their true role by relying on political power for assistance.

In general, political power transforms economic and ideological power. This means that economic and ideological power can only exercise its social influence with the cooperation and mediation of political power; the community problems, requirements, contradictions and conflicts of the economic and cultural conditions are expressed, satisfied or resolved through the prevailing political conditions.

In class societies the power feature is present in every respect of co-existence, that is in all communities and community conditions the different power specificities are attached to political power. This gave rise to the conclusion that power is identical with political power and the propagators of this view fail to realize that besides political power economic and ideological power exists separately. The kinds of separate power, however, are not of the same significance because political power is of primary importance and that is why the totality of power is found to be qualified as political power.

In bourgeois politology the conclusion that power is of a political nature is often detectable for reasons of considering power and political power to be identical. As Lasswell puts it; in a broad sense every form of power is political one.<sup>74</sup> This approach is made more accurate in Soviet politological literature by Korolev and Mushkin who say that in class societies power assumes a political nature, because it is concentrated in the hands of the ruling class.<sup>75</sup> This conclusion describes more accurately the point that in class societies power (and within this political, economic and ideological power) is concentrated in the hands of the ruling class, and since the minority of the society practices power, political power comes necessarily into prominence ensuring leading political role for the minority in the society and transmitting economic and ideological rule.

The fact that political power comes into prominence arises from social necessity; the contradictions prevailing under given economic conditions need the heavier weight and transforming role of political power. *Lenin's* statement illustrates very convincingly the social destination of political power stemming from economic needs. He says that without having a constant apparatus of force the overwhelming majority of the society cannot be forced to carry on work regularly for the rest (the minority) of the society.<sup>76</sup> As a matter of fact the apparatus of force is realizing through the system of institutions of political rule and this ensures both economic and ideological domination for the ruling class.

The fact that political power is of primary importance does not exclude, it rather presupposes the separation of economic power from ideological power because it does not incorporate any of the two into itself. Economic power relation attached to direct production is present under the

prevailing economic conditions in a form of being influenced by political power. In production proper economic power relation contains human relations associated with direction, sub and superordination, the direct management of labour, its organization and regulation. In the economy, power continues to remain one of economic nature as long as it governs the production process and the direct economic relations between people. In class societies, however, economic power presupposes that political power is a prime factor for economic power is dependent, among other things, on the nature of and specific methods of leadership adopted by political power. Namely, in class societies production, property and distribution assume a political character, because the community interests of the classes are expressed only through political mediation, and in case some production, property or distribution problem exercises an influence on the whole class, a social stratum or the society as a whole, it part and parcel of political activity and political power. For example, the power relations between capitalist and worker, owing to capitalist property, are obviously of an economic nature and these relations are transferred to the domain of political conditions and assume a political nature if they no longer express the relations between individuals; instead they contain the interests of communities, social strata having common interests and the interests of classes, in other words if the ties established or conflicts developing between the capitalist and the communities of workers are of a communal content (referring to a class or a social stratum).

*Lenin* summarized the expression of economic interests as community struggle by stating that every kind of economic struggle is a political struggle. This means that economic power can only be enforced in the framework of individual and isolated relations, but in case the awareness of the interests of the community and conflicts between community and class interests develop within the economic relations, this will immediately concern the domain of political power because it has become attached to it and will thus take the form of political struggle.

The separation of the different kinds of power from one another and their quality characteristics coming into the picture do not necessarily mean that they exercise their influence independent of one another and that a sharp line of distinction can be drawn between them. The close ties between them results, in the course of social development, in one acting as a supplement to another and one cannot fully be operative without the other. Their close association with one another is revealed, among other things, in the fact that despite their qualitative specificities they exert an influence with the active participation of political power; moreover, the state which is one of the institutions of political power is concentrated as economic and ideological power as well.

An interesting process can be observed in social development in connection with the separation of the different kinds of power. In the primitive society, there was no political power as such, and economic and ideological power, the two distinct kinds of power, are found to have merged. Following the establishment and subsequent development of the class



society political power gradually comes into prominence and economic as well as ideological power is naturally asserted with a specific content. In socialism, however, political power is gradually pushed into the background and eventually it is eliminated completely, with the coexistence of people left to be arranged by economic and ideological power. In the course of its development the working class will replace the outdated bourgeois society with an association of people that will exclude classes and antagonism and then actual political power will no longer exist.<sup>77</sup>

In conclusion it can be stated that power is manifested in a concrete form and it is revealed to assume different types in the course of historical development. Economic power and ideological power inevitably coincide with power and in class societies political power supports and concentrates them.

I said earlier that a comprehensive classification of power relations is not detectible in non-Marxist literature. This conclusion must be complemented by the point that Marxist social theory is based on a comprehensive concept and world view and so it can do the job of giving a general classification of power relations (chiefly concerning the separation of political, economic and ideological power from one another). But it has not as yet defined the other forms of power nor has it classified the actual institutions of power. Thus all that can be done at this stage is to indicate the need for the classification of power in a different manner. It appears to be extremely convenient and evident to speak about individual power, or that of a group or stratum, or the power possessed by the individual organizations. Making an approach to the different specificities of power by relying on a different type of research obviously leaves room for a classification of a different nature. In addition, the concrete forms assumed by power are still to be analysed and can be defined within the frame of the kinds of power listed and considered above. For instance, within the domain of economic power industrial or commercial power, the specific economic power possessed by capitalists or by workers (the latter having a different nature), economic power in the hands of the different strata of the ruling class (power possessed by factory owners, bankers or managers) can be subjects of separate examination. On the other hand, within the scope of ideological power studies can be made of the power of the church, arts, sciences and the press (or mass communication over a broader scale) or that of public opinion, propaganda and so on. Within the frame of political power subjects like the different, antagonistically opposed power if the ruling class and the oppressed class, state power, legal power can be examined in general, while special and more concrete studies can be made of military, state administration, executive, legislative power and that of bureaucracy, the armed forces, the court of justice, and so on.

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- <sup>45</sup> The same conclusion has been drawn by Farber and Rzevsky when they say that power is a necessary function of any community in the interest of leading its members and for the arrangement of community activities. (I. E. Farber and V. A. Rzevsky: *Voprosy teorii sovetskogo konstituzionogo prava*. Saratov, 1967. p. 88.) This conclusion is disapproved of in Soviet special literature by Baytin in *Gosudarstvo i politicheskaya vlasty*, Saratov, 1972. p. 107.
- <sup>46</sup> A. Tihomirov: *Vlasty i upravleniye v socialisticheskom obschestve*. Moscow, 1969. p. 25.
- <sup>47</sup> E. L. Kuzmin: *Mirovoye gosudarstvo: illuzii i realnosty*. Moscow, 1969. p. 22.
- <sup>48</sup> A. Pose: op. cit. p. 19.
- <sup>49</sup> Engels: *Anti-Dühring*, p. 183. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>50</sup> Malinowsky: *Baloma*. Budapest, 1972. p. 415. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>51</sup> Marx: *The Capital*. Volume I. pp. 360–361 (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>52</sup> N. M. Keyzerov: *O sootnosenii ponyatiy „sotzialnaya” i „politicheskaya” vlasty*. Vestnik L. G. U. 1966. No. 37.
- <sup>53</sup> Marx: *The Capital*. Volume III. p. 796. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>54</sup> CWME: Volume III. p. 78. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>55</sup> Ferenc Tökei: *On the Theory of Social Formations*. (A társadalmi formák elméletéhez) Budapest, 1968. pp. 169 and 200.
- <sup>56</sup> CWME: Volume III. p. 66. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>57</sup> SWME: Volume II. p. 135. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>58</sup> Marx: *The Capital*. Volume III. p. 786. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>59</sup> J. Marshall: *Swords and Symbols*. New York, 1969. p. 20.
- <sup>60</sup> Keyzerov: op. cit. p. 41.
- <sup>61</sup> Kálmán Kulcsár: *The Political Element in the Application of Law at Court and in State Administration* (A politikai elem a bírói és az államigazgatási jogalkalmazásban) Jubilee Studies (Jubileumi tanulmányok), Pécs, 1967. p. 198.
- <sup>62</sup> Marx: *The Capital*. Volume III. p. 758. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>63</sup> Marx: *The Capital*. Volume I. p. 359. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>64</sup> While applying this correlation to capitalist economic conditions Karl Marx states that the capital is the predominant economic power in the bourgeois society. (Introduction to the Criticism of Political Economy, p. 33. Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>65</sup> Marx: *Property Relations Prior to Capitalist Production*. p. 10. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>66</sup> István Hahn: *Ethnic and Universal Religions* (Etnikai és egyetemes vallások), Hungarian Philosophical Review (Magyar Filozófiai Szemle) No. 4. p. 291.
- <sup>67</sup> Engels: *Anti-Dühring*. p. 326. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>68</sup> György Lukács: *On the Ontology of Social Existence* (A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról) Volume III. Budapest, 1976. p. 19.
- <sup>69</sup> Ferenc Tökei: *Antiquity and Feudalism* (Antikvitás és feudalizmus). Budapest, 1969. p. 264.
- <sup>70</sup> CWME: Volume I. pp. 384. and 385. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>71</sup> SWME: Volume I. p. 511. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>72</sup> Engels: *Anti-Dühring*. p. 168. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>73</sup> CWL: Volume XXXIV. 261. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>74</sup> H. D. Lasswell: op. cit. p. 230.
- <sup>75</sup> A. I. Korolev and A. E. Mushkin: op. cit. p. 23.
- <sup>76</sup> CWL: Volume XXIX. p. 491. (Hungarian Edition)
- <sup>77</sup> CWME: Volume IV. p. 173.

## DER BEGRIFF UND DIE ARTEN DER MACHT

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(Zusammenfassung)

Im ersten Abschnitt der Abhandlung stellt der Verfasser fest, daß er das Thema von staats-theoretischem Standpunkt behandelt und den Begriff der Macht und des Staates von einander trennt: er hebt hervor, daß heutzutage in der sozialistischen Gesellschaftstheorie die Untersuchung der Macht in den Vordergrund tritt. Die vereinfachten Formulierungen verstehen unter Macht die menschliche Kraft, die Autorität, die Naturkraft, die übernatürlichen Faktoren, dagegen sind der gesellschaftliche Charakter und die Zusammenhänge der Macht zu untersuchen.

Der II. Abschnitt gibt über die den Begriff der Macht betreffenden wichtigeren Anschauungen einen Überblick. Er macht uns mit den abstrakten Definitionen von Dahl, Russel, Parsons, ferner mit dem Machtbegriff von M. Weber bekannt. Dann hebt er von den Definitionen des Machtbegriffs die wesentlichen Kennzeichen hervor. Unter diesen kommen folgende vor: der Einfluß, die Entscheidung, die Kontrolle, der Zwang und die Gewalt, der freiwillige Gehorsam, der Konflikt und der gesellschaftliche Konsens. Der Verfasser macht die Bemerkung, daß es unter den Definitionen exakte Ergebnisse gibt, die von der marxistischen Gesellschaftstheorie in die Machttheorie eingebaut werden.

Im III. Abschnitt hebt der Verfasser auf Grund der Erkenntnisse und Thesen der Klassiker des Marxismus die allgemeinen, wesentlichen Zusammenhänge der Macht hervor. So stellt er fest, daß die Macht in erster Linie die vereinigte Kraft der Individuen, eine „vervielfachte Produktionskraft“ ist, der objektive Bedarf des durch die Existenz der menschlichen Gemeinschaften bedingten gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens. Die Macht dient der Sicherheit, der Integration der Gemeinschaften, im Interesse dessen bedeutet sie eine organisatorische und regelnde Tätigkeit. Zu den wesentlichen Eigenschaften der Macht gehören die Leitungstätigkeit, die Unter- und Überordnung, die Absonderung der Leiter und Geleiteten, ihre Institutionalisierung und die Möglichkeit der Zwangsanwendung. Danach stellt der Verfasser die Geschichte der Macht dar. Er betont, daß die Macht ständig mit der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft verbunden ist und in den verschiedenen Gesellschaftsordnungen über abweichenden Inhalt und Formlösungen verfügt.

Im IV. Abschnitt weist der Verfasser auf die mit der Gruppierung der Macht verbundenen Anschauungen hin. Dann hebt er die drei Arten der Macht hervor: die wirtschaftliche, die ideologische und die politische Macht. Dabei weist er darauf hin, daß es auf mikrostruktureller Ebene auch eine andere Gruppierung vorkommt. Er zeigt uns die Eigenschaften der wirtschaftlichen Macht, den Machtcharakter des Eigentums, seinen Einfluß auf das Verteilungs- und Verbrauchsverhältnis. Dann hebt er den wesentlichen Charakterzug der ideologischen Macht, in erster Linie ihre ideell-zusammenhaltende Rolle hervor. Er weist auf die Rolle der teokratischen Auffassung und der Religion in der Macht und auf die neueren Formen der institutionellen ideellen Einwirkung hin. Danach analysiert er die charakteristischen Züge der politischen Macht. Vor allem hebt er hervor, daß die politische Macht eine abgesonderte Art der Macht ist und als solche gegenüber den anderen Machtarten einen primären Platz einnimmt, die vermittelt die anderen und geschichtlich mit den Klassengesellschaften verbunden ist.

Am Ende betont der Verfasser, daß eine weitere Analyse der Macht die Erschließung neuerer Teilzusammenhänge zur Folge haben wird und auch eine andere Klassifikation vorzunehmen ist.



## ПОНЯТИЕ И ВИДЫ ВЛАСТИ

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(Резюме)

В первой главе научной работы автор констатирует, что тему он рассматривает с точки зрения теории государства, разделяет понятие власти и государства, подчеркивает, что рассмотрение власти в настоящее время выходит на первый план в социалистической теории общества. По упрощенному смыслу под властью понимаются человеческая сила и авторитет человека, сила природы и сверхъестественные факторы, однако нам следует рассматривать общественный характер и взаимоотношения власти.

Во второй главе дает обзор о главнейших взглядах о понятии власти. Излагает абстрактные дефиниции Дала, Руссела и Парсонса и потом понятие М. Вебера о власти. Устанавливает главнейшие признаки понятия власти в этих определениях. Между прочим: влияние, решение, проверка, принуждение и насилие, добровольное послушание, конфликт и общественное согласие. Автор отмечает, что некоторые определения имеют экзактные результаты, которые марксистская теория общества включила в теорию о власти.

В третьей главе автор подчеркивает общие существенные взаимосвязи власти на основе познаний и положений классиков максизма. Таким образом устанавливает, что власть является в первую очередь совместная сила индивидов, «умноженная производительная сила», объективная необходимость общественного сосуществования, обусловленная существованием человеческих сообществ. Власть обеспечивает безопасность и интеграцию сообществ и в интересах этого осуществляет организационную и регулирующую деятельность. Существенными особенностями власти являются управление, подчиненность, отделение руководителей от управляемых, их организованность и возможность принуждения. — После этого автор показывает историчность власти. Подчеркивает, что власть — постоянный проводник развития человеческого общества и в разных общественных формах обладает разным содержанием формациями.

В четвертой главе автор ссылается на мнения о классификации власти. Потом определяет три вида власти: экономическую, идеологическую и политическую. При этом указывает на то, что на уровне микроструктур существует и другая классификация. — Показывает свойства экономической власти, властный характер собственности, ее влияние в распределительных и потребительных условиях, Потом говорит о существенной черте идеологической власти, т. е. о ее идейной сплачивающей роли. Ссылается на мощную роль теократической концепции и религии, а потом на новейшие формы организованного идеологического воздействия. Затем анализирует характерные черты политической власти. Прежде всего подчеркивает, что политическая власть является обособленным видом власти и как таков первичным по сравнению с другими видами власти, посредником других видов, но исторически связывается с классовыми обществами.

На конец автор устанавливает, что дальнейший анализ власти приведет к раскрытию новых зависимостей составных частей частных связей и к возможности классификации другого характера.